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History, Violence, and Legitimacy in Uganda:
An Anthropological Analysis of Post-Colonial
Politics and ICC Intervention
Todd Jonathan Ebling
University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
Abstract: In recent debates between social scientists and human rights and
legal scholars, many anthropologists have argued that the successes or failures
of transitional justice mechanisms to contribute to peace depend on a wide
range of contextually situated historical, political, socio-economic, and
cultural factors (see Hinton 2010). Human rights organizations often
disregard or sideline such contextual specifics and favor a narrow definition
of justice in terms of the unwavering punitive orthodoxy of international
courts as the primary solution to conflict. Looking through an anthropological
lens in this paper, I focus on the history of politics in post-colonial Uganda in
order to render clearer the cycle of violence that emerged as a prominent
feature of the political landscape of the region. Against this contextualized
backdrop, I investigate the case of conflict between the Ugandan state and the
Lord’s Resistance Army, and problematize the role of one international
human rights organization, the International Criminal Court. I argue that by
continuing its intervention in Uganda’s justice matters, the ICC is
inadvertently granting the same kind of amnesty to past atrocities that it so
condemns for present ones, and in doing so, grants international legitimacy to
the current state while de-legitimizing non-state local forms of justice.
Although ethnographic “field notes” are not included in the following pages,
this essay represents one anthropologist’s analytical engagement with issues
of justice in Uganda.
Keywords: Nor ther n Uganda, post-colonial politics, legitimacy, International
Criminal Court, Lord’s Resistance Army

Introduction
This article focuses on the history of politics in post-colonial Uganda
in order to render clearer the cycle of violence that emerged as a prominent
feature of the political landscape of the region. Using Weber’s theory of the
state as a departure point, I elaborate the ethnic dimensions of post-colonial
politics, focusing mainly on the history of conflict between the Baganda of
southern Uganda and the Acholi of northern Uganda. Under the political calField Notes: A Journal of Collegiate Anthropology 7(1):20–34 (June 2015)
Copyright © 2015 by Field Notes: A Journal of Collegiate Anthropology

Ebling 21
culus of the military regimes of several leaders, and through a succession of
violent coups and the concomitant seizure of government administration, ethnicity became an essential feature of politics since Idi Amin’s despotic presidency of the 1970s. Against the contextualized backdrop of such politicalethnic violence, I investigate the case of conflict between the Ugandan state
and the Lord’s Resistance Army, and problematize the role of one international human rights organization, the International Criminal Court (ICC). I argue
that by continuing its intervention in Uganda’s justice matters, the ICC is inadvertently granting the same kind of amnesty to past atrocities that it so condemns for present ones, and in doing so, grants international legitimacy to the
current state while de-legitimizing non-state local forms of justice.
Post-colonial politics in Uganda
According to Max Weber, the state's very application and threat of
physical force—i.e. its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence—is the
constituting factor of its politics. In The Theory of Economic and Social Organization, he famously noted: “An imperatively co-ordinated corporate
group will be called 'political' if and in so far as the enforcement of its order is
carried out continually within a given territorial area by the application and
threat of physical force on the part of the administrative staff” (1965:154). In
Weberian terms, the present “political” situation in the territory of Uganda is
composed of a historically changing environment of physical force as enacted
through transitions of state violence and a succession of corporate groups
overthrowing one another to take power and establish their order. Particularly,
how has the current regime emerged amidst this post-colonial era of such legitimizing, de-legitimizing, and re-legitimizing transitions of state and how
has the Lord’s Resistance Army emerged as a response?
In the early 1970s, human rights abuses in Uganda received widespread attention because of the rise and despotism of General Idi Amin Dada.
Amin's very name conjures the archetype of post-colonial African dictatorship and his regime is still remembered as “one of Africa's bloodiest and most
tyrannical” (Kustenbauder 2010:456). His period of rule began through a violent coup détat against President Milton Obote in January of 1971. Obote
found refuge in Tanzania and attempted a military counter-coup in 1972 that
included many of his supporting members of the Ugandan army who were of
Acholi and Langi ethnicity. Obote’s attempt failed, and, in response, Amin
bombed Tanzanian towns and ordered for Acholi and Langi members of the
Ugandan army to return to their barracks where he promptly proceeded to
have them massacred in a move which Van Acker notes, “firmly introduced
competitive retaliation on an ethnic basis” throughout the region and country

22 History, Violence, And Legitimacy In Uganda
(2004:340). Thus any prior suspicion amongst the Ugandan public about how
politics was affected by ethnic prejudice became concretely justified after this
move, and a broader system of violent political organization began to take
shape in Uganda. The violent ethnic retaliations continued and eventually
“grew to include the whole of the army, and then Ugandan civilians, as Amin
became increasingly paranoid” (Boddy-Evans 2003:1).
In the mid-1970s, Amin’s paranoia led to massive ethnic expulsions
and the murder of prominent figures, such as Attorney General Ben Kiwanuka and the Anglican archbishop of Uganda, Janani Luwum (Apter 1997; State
House of Uganda 2014). Amin trusted no one, and the preservation of his
status as “His Excellency, President for Life, Lord of All the Beasts of the
Earth and Fishes of the Seas and Conqueror of the British Empire in Africa”
became more important than his responsibility toward citizens or the pursuit
of any form of democracy in Uganda. Amin’s paranoia precipitated a state of
increased militarization and produced ever greater paranoia amongst his cabinet, the media, and the public. In September 1975, analyst Michael Schultheis
wrote: “The military is the principle consumer of public revenues. General
Amin and his military council are the final voices in establishing economic
and other national priorities. The military presence is everywhere. Normal
business activities as well as routine operational decisions within government
ministries are carried out in an atmosphere of fear and guilt” (1975:30).
Amin’s paranoia resulted in two problems that delegitimized his
campaign and led to his eventual ousting. First, Amin expelled Asians—who
composed a large part of the Ugandan economy—from the state in an attempt
to gain economic independence and liberate his people. Coupled with a dramatic increase in military spending, this avowed “economic war” pushed an
already waning Ugandan economy into crisis, and Amin increasingly became
rejected by his own army and citizens of Uganda (see Schultheis 1975). Second, Amin’s paranoia led to a campaign of large-scale persecution of rival
tribes and Obote supporters, and the initiation of “killer squads,” or more formally, his “Public Safety Unit,” “State Research Bureau,” and “military police,” which contributed to the murdering of hundreds of thousands of people
(Library of Congress Country Studies 2015). Overall, the suspicion and fear
generated by his actions and his regime ultimately contributed to the emergence of large-scale ethnic prejudice and a politics of ethnic retaliation in
Uganda (Van Acker 2004).
In 1979, shortly after Amin lost general public support, Obote’s regime ousted him and Obote took the presidency again. But by 1981, Obote
was already dealing with a brutal civil war of his own. Yoweri Museveni's
National Resistance Army (NRA) struggled against Obote's Uganda's National Liberation Army (UNLA), and their confrontation reached its apogee in
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Obote's 1983 attack on the Luwero district. Obote unleashed such an attack—
also known as “Operation Bonanza”—in order to “wreak havoc on the local
Baganda population” (Van Acker 2004:340), and it ultimately resulted in the
death of over 300,000 civilians and NRA soldiers at the hands of the mostly
Acholi UNLA force (Kustenbader 2010:456). And, following the cycle of the
same politics of retaliation that began with Amin, ethnic prejudice continued
to pervade the state under Obote’s second period in office.
Over time, the UNLA became increasingly divided and split into
ethnic factions with the Acholi holding the most power. In July 1985, Tito
Okello led an armed Acholi coalition to Kampala and forced Obote into exile
and, as Kustenbauder notes: “For the first time in the country's bloody history
executive and military power was held by the Acholi” (2010:457). This did
not last long and one year later Museveni and the NRA—many of whom were
of Baganda ethnicity—reassembled and retaliated against the Acholi for their
previous cruelty in Luwero. The NRA shifted their attention north and attacked and committed large-scale abuses against both civilians and UNLA
forces in the Acholi towns of Gulu and Kitgum (Kustenbauder 2010). Eventually, Museveni ousted Okello and has been in power since 1986.
Since Idi Amin, politics in Uganda has become increasingly synonymous with violent overthrows and militarization. Score-settling, political paranoia, de-humanization and abuse against civilians—these under guises of
ethnic pride, nationalism, or economic development—played roles in shaping
what it meant to be politically active in Uganda. In the period between 1971
and 1985, it is estimated that 800,000 or more Ugandans were killed because
of politically inspired violence (Tripp 2004:4). Such is the very basic background to the political-ethnic environment in which the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) came into existence.
The emergence of the Lord’s Resistance Army
After Museveni gained control of the state, the northern region of
Uganda quickly became a hotbed of insurgent activity against the current regime (Finnstrom 2008). Amidst the chaos of ethnically tied political violence,
the LRA emerged as a reactionary group of “religious terrorism” (Van Acker
2004:349) fighting in the name of God against the political marginalization of
the Acholi people by the current state.i Specifically, the human rights atrocities of the LRA have consistently shown a cycle of violence and a pattern of
brutalization of civilians “by acts including murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, mutilation, as well as mass burnings of houses and looting of
camp settlements; abducted civilians, including children, are said to have
been forcibly ‘recruited’ as fighters, porters and sex slaves to serve the LRA
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and to contribute to attacks against the Ugandan army and civilian communities” (The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and
Dominic Ongwen., Warrant of Arrest 3/2 [2005]). LRA commanders have
forced their fighters, many of whom were children, “to kill and inflict horrific
injuries by cutting off the ears, noses, lips, and limbs of defenseless civilians” (Pham et al. 2008:405).
The LRA uses these tactics essentially as a tool of terror to counter
the current regime's historical monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (see
Weber 1998 [1948]:78) to enforce their own version of order amongst the
populations in the north. Van Acker writes:
Terror is a vehicle to project power towards the Ugandan
state by creating a state of exception and immobilizing the
population, on the fringes of society, effectively enough to
enforce a distinction between “law” and “unlaw,” where
rules other than those set by the LRA do not hold. To be
effective, terror must be more than a threat which, tragically
enough, is confirmed by the daily litany of atrocities [in
northern Uganda]. While the desired political change remains non-specific, indiscriminate violence—terror—
becomes an end in itself; it generalizes responsibility
through the logic of the hostage: since anybody can be hit,
anybody can be blackmailed by terrorism. [2004:350]
The continual acts of terror increased into the late 1990s and early 2000s and
effectively pushed many out of their homes and into around 200 poorly
guarded and poorly resourced Internally Displaced Persons camps (Allen
2006), thus rendering an entire region of individuals that zoeii of mere biological existence; that “bare life” confined to the camp (Redfield 2013:16–19;
see also Redfield 2005:330). In October of 2002, the Ugandan army evacuated more than 400,000 civilians to avoid an all-out genocide by the LRA and
by 2005, over one-and-a-half million people were displaced by the LRA
while tens of thousands were witnesses to or victims of torture, “including
robbery, rape, gunshots, landmines, bombs, harassment, maiming, and killing
of people” (Tumushabe 2001:Report introduction). This ultimately drew the
attention of the recently codified International Criminal Court (ICC).
The current state's legitimacy was called into question by the LRA's
forceful disordering of the northern region and the state's limited response to
control this civil conflict for 20 years. In an attempt to defuse the situation,
the state passed an Amnesty Act in 2000. Yet, in a contradictory move during
the escalation of violence in the region, the government of Uganda put in a
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referral to the ICC to issue arrest warrants for the LRA's commanders, which
was unsealed in 2005. Peace talks seemed a possibility in the mid 2000s, but
by 2008 Kony refused to meet until the ICC revoked the arrest warrants, and
the LRA then fled into “the bush” in the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, and the Central African Republic. They have continued their brutality there, thus further complicating regional state relations. But what exactly does the ICC’s continued intervention in regional affairs suggest about the
global politics of state legitimizing?
ICC intervention and the politics of legitimacy
The ICC as an international body gains its legitimacy through international consensus. Unlike the ICC, the current Ugandan state historically
demanded its authority through a succession of violent political overthrows
and has maintained legitimacy through the more or less democratic voting
process since 1986. These two kinds of legitimacy—international and state—
are not mutually exclusive and can work in tandem to produce an emergent
form of international politics of state legitimizing. In the case of northern
Uganda, the question surrounding this emergence remains: how is the ICC
positioned in relation to the state and how has the state exerted its influence
on the ICC?
As a signatory to the ICC’s Rome Statute, Uganda is currently within the purview of the ICC. The case was referred in 2003 by the Ugandan
state, and an arrest warrant for warlord and LRA commander, Joseph Kony,
includes twelve counts of crimes against humanity—murder, enslavement,
sexual enslavement, rape, inhumane acts of inflicting serious bodily injury
and suffering—and twenty-one counts of war crimes—murder, cruel treatment of civilians, intentionally directing an attack against the civilian population, pillaging, inducing rape, and forced enlistment of children (ICC 2014).
Other influential LRA personnel such as the Vice-Chairman and Second-incommand Vincent Otti and high-ranking leader Okot Odhiambo have outstanding warrants of arrest as well (ICC 2014). Referencing the 2004 Letter of
Jurisdiction, the official ICC court case reads:iii
“the Government of Uganda has been unable to arrest …
persons who may bear the greatest responsibility” for the
crimes within the referred situation; that “the ICC is the
most appropriate and effective forum for the investigation
and prosecution of those bearing the greatest responsibility”
for those crimes; and that the Government of Uganda “has
not conducted and does not intend to conduct national pro-
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ceedings in relation to the persons most responsible.” [The
Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo
and Dominic Ongwen, Warrant of Arrest 11/23 (2005)]
The report does not expound on any of the reasons for the Government’s inactivity on these issues. Whether the Government of Uganda lacks resources to
control the conflict or whether this move is a purposeful evading of state responsibility to the citizens of northern Uganda is unclear.
What is clear is that the ICC’s arrest warrant for Kony and the LRA
leaders signaled a specific point in time of international intervention, and in
so doing, affirms the lack of the current Ugandan state’s ability to deal with
its own civil war. Since the ICC’s beginning, scholars have debated the ICC’s
involvement in condoning a state’s inactivity, and have broadly questioned
the ICC’s role in granting and affirming international legitimacy of particular
states (for more on this, see Branch 2007). In this case, the ICC’s efforts to
bring Joseph Kony on charges of crimes against humanity simultaneously
result in the legitimation of the current regime—one that is also implicated in
political state sponsored violence against its citizens and one which emerged
from the same historical cycle of ethnic violence which begat the LRA.
As an international human rights institution, the ICC has reified the
legitimacy of the current Ugandan state through its intervention in regional
politics. Part of this reification includes a kind of forgetfulness on the part of
the ICC—a not-remembering or misremembering of the history of violence
that shaped the contemporary context of statehood. The actions taken by the
ICC have signified a break with a past of ethnically charged political violence
and brutality against civilians in the name of score-settling. This past forgotten has not been forgotten by all; many memories of ethnic violence in the
past half-century of political transitions in Uganda persist despite the ICC’s
implicit historical amnesia (or their explicit choosing the side of the de facto
current regime which, thus, grants a kind of amnesty to the violence of politics past).
At base, it would be irresponsible to suggest that the ICC indict
Yoweri Museveni, or NRA or UNLA leaders for crimes committed against
humanity in the 1980s.iv This kind of adjudicative deliberation would quickly
turn into the proverbial “he started it” arguments that do not end. However, if
human rights institutions were to make a public project out of the recollection
and identification of past atrocities in Uganda, this would be one helpful way
of moving the larger project of justice in Uganda forward, much like the Historical Clarification Commission has done in Guatemala (Tomuschat 2001) or
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have done in South Africa (Allais
2011), Sierra Leone (Svard 2010), and a number of countries in Africa and
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South America.v Ricoeur writes: “Extracting the exemplary value from traumatic memories, it is justice that turns memory into a project; and it is this
same project of justice that gives the form of the future and of the imperative
of the duty of memory” (2004:88). Any future of justice—whether retributive,
restorative, or otherwise—in post-conflict northern Uganda cannot be imagined as “just” if the historically traumatic memories of political violence and
marginalization of so many in the north are excluded from the state and international projects of justice.
Problems with the universal justice of the ICC
The ICC seeks to end impunity and to pursue justice in terms of the
accountability and disciplinary mechanisms of the Western-style courtroom.
The ICC has used its international authority to arrest individuals accused of
crimes against humanity and place them on trial at The Hague.vi The principle
by which a universal human rights and justice is sought above and beyond the
legal system of states is itself problematic as it implicates a hierarchy between
the West and developing countries that might even be paternalistic, or part of
the machinery of monolithic modernity, what Arturo Escobar refers to as
“imperial globality” (Escobar 2004). A particularly striking example of this
paternalism is the fact that the majority of cases pursued by the ICC thus far
have focused on bringing perpetrators of central African states to trial in Europe. Moreover, the paternalism is magnified by the univocally defined category of international justice as punitive justice.
Punitive justice is the exclusive form of justice pursued by the ICC,
as national amnesty or local versions and visions of justice are thought to reinforce impunity. Sally Engle Merry writes: “As a legal system, human rights
law endeavors to apply universal principles to all situations uniformly. It does
not tailor its interventions to specific political and social situations, even
when these might suggest different approaches to social justice. Local context
is ignored in order to establish global principles” (2006:103). As if the punishment could fit the crime, human rights violators are pursued and given
sentences by the ICC according to a single code of agreed-upon international
regulations, often at the expense of local priorities. The language of punishment and accountability for human rights violations has yet to translate
“down” from The Hague, as the ICC’s justice discourse has not been clarified
in any practical way to northern Ugandans (see discussion of “translation of
human rights” in Merry 2006). What remains problematic still is whether
such translation is even appropriate in this case.vii
Misaligned with the ICC's exclusively punitive justice but at the request of many civic organizations in the north, the Ugandan state adopted an
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Amnesty Act as a possible catalyst to discontinue violence and impunity in
the north. As amnesty requires a degree of short-term “amnesia” of crimes
committed—which is not part of the orthodoxy of the punitive justice of the
ICC—the ICC dismissed the Act, pursued warrants of arrest, and the Ugandan
state reacted accordingly by amending the Act (Branch 2007:184). As Sharf
states, it is “inappropriate for an international criminal court to defer to a national amnesty in a situation where the amnesty violates obligations contained
in the very international conventions that make up the court's subject matter
jurisdiction” (1999:514).
The fact should not be overlooked that the current state had its own
invested motivations for such a quick amendment of the Amnesty Act.
Branch writes:
Indeed, since 1986 the government has vigorously promoted a military approach to the northern crisis, and so the ICC
intervention, by providing international legitimation for the
military campaign in the name of enforcing international
law, has cleared the way for the government's militarism. …
[The current state] maintains military control over the north,
a potential base of political opposition, while being able to
invoke the specter of the LRA to maintain support in the
south. Furthermore, the war allows President Museveni to
maintain a large, unreformed army upon which he increasingly bases his own power. High levels of defense spending, justified by the war, have created a constituency within
the UPDF for its continuation, and many Acholi see their
displacement as a strategy by the government to open their
land to occupation by southerners and foreigners. [2007:184
–185]
Some commentators have even gone so far as to speculate that the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC had been manipulated by Museveni, who was looking for a
way “to stave off international pressure to end his military campaign” (Baines
2005:5). Some northerners, in fact, speculated that the current regime had
stake in keeping the north weak by keeping the conflict alive (Redfield
2010:181). Nonetheless, the amendment that the state adopted granted amnesty to ex-LRA combatants in the north, but upheld the ICC's arrest warrants for
the LRA's five leading figures. Amnesty was thus granted for all but a few.
The amendment essentially resulted in the avoidance of a number of possible
avenues toward peace by the LRA's leadership as long as the ICC was involved in regional issues of justice (Branch 2007). Moreover, the unsealing of
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arrest warrants may have exacerbated the situation in the neighboring states of
the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African
Republic. The state's involvement with the ICC thus far has shown the complicated limitations of transnational punitive justice demands to contribute to
regional peace.
In the wake of these decisions by the ICC and state, traditional and
religious leaders and international activists and agencies have advocated for
the codification of community-based rituals of justice in northern Uganda
(Allen 2008). These rituals focus on the restoration of relationships that have
gone bad because of past violence. As they largely focus on the reintegration
of individuals into communities and the restoration of communities that have
been broken by acts of war (Anyeko et al. 2012; Baines 2005), the practices
tell a counter-narrative of resistance to the dominant strictly punitive justice
of the ICC. There are obvious difficulties in codifying local rituals of justice
(see Doughty 2014:784), yet in a context like post-colonial northern Uganda,
where perpetrator and victim are often unclear, these mechanisms may ultimately prove more effective in contributing to peace at the local level.viii At
the very least, local reconciliation rituals must be granted a degree of legitimacy by international human rights organizations like the ICC as possible
sources to break the cycle of political violence and to pursue processes of
healing between ethnic communities.
Conclusion
In summary, a politics of ethnic retaliation emerged in Uganda during the reign of Idi Amin. Through a succession of violent political overthrows, the current regime gained power and has been in power since 1986.
The LRA also emerged amidst such violence in response to the ethnic marginalization of Acholi people of northern Uganda, and continued to roll forward the cycle of violence in the name of politics. The ICC has intervened in
an attempt to end the LRA’s terror, but has implicitly and inadvertently sided
with the current state that was implicated in political crimes against its citizens in the 1980s. By getting involved in this case, the ICC has reified the
legitimacy of the current state, and in doing so, has granted a kind of historical amnesty—via forgetfulness or the suspension of memory—to the violence
of politics past and has exculpated the current state from previous abuses
against its citizens. Further, justice has been defined narrowly in terms of accountability and punishment in the international human rights discourse of the
ICC, thus sidelining local ideas and practices of community restoration. For
the Acholi who have been an ethnically marginalized group by the current
state since 1986, this move by the ICC has added insult to injury and has left
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the Acholi little power to deal with their own situation in ways they see fit.
The integration of local systems of justice into international frameworks may
be one possible approach (see Clark 2010; Quinn 2007; Rose 2008), but if
and how this will be pragmatically feasible remains unclear.

Notes
i

For more on the religious dimensions of the LRA see Behrend’s 1999 discussion of Alice
Lakwena and the Holy Spirit Movement.
ii
Redfield uses the Aristotelian distinction, à la Hannah Arendt (1998), between zoe and bios. Zoe
(from which the contemporary English term, zoology derives) represents “the cyclical life
shared by all species, in which birth and death occur in repetitive patterns,” whereas bios
(from which the contemporary English term biography derives) represents “the linear life
narrated by humans as a directional story, in which birth and death mark beginning and
end” (Redfield 2013:16). In a 2005 article for Cultural A nthropology entitled “Doctors,
Borders, and Life in Crisis,” wherein Redfield presents the case of Médecins Sans Frontières
in northern Uganda, he explains: “I use these terms to identify an inherent tension within the
value of ‘life’ that humanitarians seek to defend, between the maintenance of physical existence, on the one hand, and the defense of human dignity, on the other hand. I suggest that the
significance of a survival state like zoe rests less in any facts of biological nature per se than
it does in its threat to bios by demarcating a lower threshold possibility of ‘life.’ Amid
worldwide zones of repeated disaster, medical humanitarian action offers the promise of
preserving existence. It does so, however, at the possible expense of deferring actions that
might support a mode of being more consistent with dignity. The potential stabilization of
crisis in these terms, I suggest, reveals an essential ethical quandary in the haunting possibility of a form of distinction enacted within life itself that simultaneously includes and excludes different human populations at the species level” (2005:330).
iii See: http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%
20icc%200204/related%20cases/icc%200204%200105/court%20records/chambers/pre%
20trial%20chamber%20ii/Pages/warrant%20of%20arrest%20for%20joseph%20kony%
20issued%20on%208th%20july%202005%20as%20amended%20on%2027th%
20september%202005.aspx
iv
Museveni’s UPDF is not in itself innocent regarding recent human rights abuses in the north
and their motivations show another layer of complexity. Phil Clark cites a UNHCR study:
“Local and international human rights groups have reported regular and grave atrocities
committed by the UPDF in northern Uganda, particularly the forced displacement of around
1.5 million civilians into IDP camps. A recent qualitative study by the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights highlighted that the majority of the 1725 victims interviewed considered both the LRA and the government responsible for the immense harm they
have suffered during the conflict” (2008:43).
v
Some have argued, nonetheless, that Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) have deep
problems of their own—e.g., see Wilson 2001 for a South African TRC example; Shaw 2007
for a Sierra Leone TRC example.
vi
Last year, for example, Liberia’s 65-year-old Charles Taylor was tried by the ICC for war
crimes and is now serving a 50-year sentence in the UK (Reuters 2013). Also, currently the
ICC is in the process of handling the recent capture of the so-called “white ant,” LRA commander Dominic Ongwen (HRW 2015). He will not be tried by Uganda’s International
Crimes Division, and was flown directly to The Hague for his awaiting prosecution.
vii
In “Culpability and Reparation,” Nandini Sundar (2014) addresses some of the issues at stake
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viii

in the sort of one-size-fits-all trickle-down justice from “the West” to “the rest.”
There is difficulty in codifying local rituals of justice in northern Uganda for two reasons: 1)
there is a variety of distinct traditions, and 2) codifying a custom inevitably changes it. The
first reason implies questions of ethnic exclusion—i.e. should the state or an organization
implement the mato oput ritual of the Acholi or the gomo tong of the Madi? The second
reason implies questions about the “transition” of transitional justice. Allen notes: “as anthropologists have shown, local customs relating to accountability can be highly dynamic
and remarkably adaptable; they are rarely static and timeless. This is partly because they are
mostly not written down but are endlessly negotiated. To codify or regulate them changes
them” (Allen and Macdonald 2013). How and to what extent the codification of “local justice” systems has influenced transitional justice in northern Uganda has yet to be demonstrated.
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